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Joseph P. Liu** 
Good morning.  I want to start by thanking the organizers of this conference, the 
Kernochan Center, and Jane Ginsburg in particular for inviting me here to speak 
today.  I was especially excited to be invited, not only because I attended this law 
school many years ago, but also because the subject of this conference is, in many 
ways, a copyright professor’s dream.  As you may know, law professors love 
hypotheticals—the more outlandish the better.  And here we have an entire 
conference devoted to considering not just hypotheticals, but real-life cases that 
stretch the outer boundaries of copyright and force us to confront some of the most 
basic principles in this area of the law.  So to be able to spend an entire day with 
some very smart people talking about these cases is a real treat. 
The title of my talk today is, “What Belongs in Copyright?”  When Jane invited 
me to speak, she asked me to provide a “more Olympian perspective” on the issues 
of authorship, originality, and fixation that are the subjects of today’s conference.  
And while I don’t pretend to have any Zeus-like powers of insight or observation, I 
do hope to provide at least some general thoughts about the question implied by the 
title of this conference, namely, what properly belongs within the scope of 
copyright.  In particular, I want to spend some time talking about how copyright 
law constructs the box that defines what is inside copyright and outside. 
I will start by very briefly surveying some of the doctrines that define what can 
be copyrighted.  I will then talk a bit about what theory or set of theories we might 
look at to help decide these difficult boundary cases, to help decide what belongs in 
that box.  And finally, at the very end I will suggest that underlying all of these 
doctrines and theories are relatively unexamined aesthetic judgments about what 
counts as copyrightable subject matter, judgments that we should probably take 
more expressly into account when deciding when something is copyrightable.  My 
goal in these remarks is not so much to provide any specific answers, but to set the 
table and provide some general frameworks for the more detailed discussion to 
come. 
So to start, how does copyright law construct the box?  What doctrines define 
the subject matter of copyright?  The standard answer, the one that begins every 
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introductory copyright law course, is originality and fixation.  These are the 
traditional subject matter doctrines set forth in section 102(a).1  And of these two 
it’s clear that originality does most of the work.  In most copyright courses, we 
spend a good deal of time going over the early cases that help define originality—
—Sarony,2 Bleistein,3 Catalda,4 and all the rest, which define originality as 
independent creation and some modicum of creativity.  We follow these cases all 
the way up to the Supreme Court decision in Feist.5  And all along we emphasize 
the relatively modest requirements for satisfying originality. 
We then typically move on to consider some of the exclusions from copyright 
set forth in section 102(b) and elsewhere:  the exclusions for facts, ideas, methods 
of operations, and all of the difficult line drawing questions that these doctrines 
create (e.g., what about so called “created facts,” fictional histories, etc.).6  We also 
discuss the useful article doctrine and the limit that functionality places on 
copyright, policing the boundary between copyright and patent.  Together, all of 
these doctrines, grouped loosely under the heading of originality, undeniably play 
the primary role in defining what is copyrightable subject matter. 
Now, I’m actually not interested so much in talking about these particular 
doctrines for the purposes of today’s talk, in part because Rob Kasunic covered 
them so well just now, but also because I am more interested in how other doctrines 
also serve the same function—doctrines that we don’t normally think of as playing 
a significant role in policing copyrightable subjected matter, since these are the 
doctrines that are implicated by many of today’s panels. 
For example, what about fixation?  If originality plays the starring role in setting 
copyrightable subject matter, fixation is at most a bit player.  The typical copyright 
course doesn’t spend much time on fixation and for good reason because it’s rarely 
an issue.  Most copyrighted works easily satisfy the fixation requirement.  In most 
cases where someone brings a lawsuit, the copyrighted work has in fact been fixed. 
Indeed, the fixation requirement is so easily satisfied that sometimes we have a 
hard time figuring out why it exists in the first place. 
It might be a constitutional requirement, given that the Constitution talks about 
“Writings,” but that just raises the question:  why is it in the Constitution?  Perhaps 
it serves as a rough proxy for deciding when works are commercially valuable, 
since it is often necessary to fix a work in order to exploit it economically.  Some 
have suggested that fixation serves an evidentiary purpose, since otherwise it would 
be hard to prove infringement if there were no fixed copies.7  Still others have 
suggested that fixation serves notice to third parties about the existence and scope 
of the copyright claim.8  Many of these justifications, and I think the ones that are 
 
 1. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
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probably most persuasive, are grounded in more practical concerns about 
administrability of the copyright system. 
Yet the administrative function of fixation raises the possibility of a disjuncture 
between practical concerns about administrability and substantive concerns about 
rewarding and providing incentives for certain forms of creativity.  In other words, 
there may well be cases where the concern about administrability leaves 
unprotected certain types of creative activity that we would otherwise be interested 
in protecting.  Because, after all, unfixed works can be extremely creative.  Take, 
for example, an improvised jazz solo—or a comedy performance, unfixed dance 
performances, dramatic performances, extemporaneous speeches or conversations, 
certain forms of modern or conceptual art that are ephemeral in nature.9  The 
fixation requirement has the effect of screening out certain forms of creativity (at 
least under federal law).  Again, in most cases this probably is not a significant 
problem because most works are fixed, but this may create tricky questions at the 
boundary, which is what we are most concerned about today.  This is one area 
where there might be a policing function that fixation plays in setting the 
substantive scope of what can be copyrighted. 
So far I have talked about the two traditional doctrines that police copyrightable 
subject matter.  I want to mention two more.  First, what is a “work of authorship”?  
Section 102(a) says that copyright subsists in “works of authorship” and although 
the Copyright Act does not define what a work of authorship is, it does say that this 
“include[s]” a list of different types of works, the familiar list that you see in 
102(a).10  Traditionally, “work of authorship” has not served as a meaningful limit 
on copyrightable subject matter, and this is because most works can probably be fit 
into one of these categories on the list.  Moreover, the statutory language says 
“include,” which suggests that this list is not exclusive.  So, in theory, courts could 
consider other works that are not on this list and include them in copyrightable 
subject matter.11 
At the same time, courts have generally not taken up the invitation to recognize 
new categories of works, so the doctrine seems to play little or no role in defining 
copyrightable subject matter.  (Although query whether courts have in some 
instances de facto created new categories.  For example, the recent Batmobile case 
in the Ninth Circuit provides an interesting example.12  Have the courts essentially 
created a new subject matter category for fictional or literary characters?) 
Now this of course could change, and the panels in today’s conference highlight 
why that might be.  There may well be areas of creative endeavor that do not fit 
cleanly within any of these existing statutory categories.  For example, at least one 
 
 9. See Megan Carpenter & Stephen Hetcher, Function Over Form: Bringing The Fixation 
Requirement Into The Modern Era, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221 , 2271 (2014). 
 10. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (stating that works of authorship include literary works; musical 
works; dramatic works; pantomimes; choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
motion pictures; other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural works). 
 11. For a comprehensive analysis of “works of authorship,” see R. Anthony Reese, Copyrightable 
Subject Matter In The “Next Great Copyright Act,” 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1489 (2014). 
 12. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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European court has recognized a copyright in a perfume.13  Could U.S. law 
copyright protect a perfume?  It does not fit neatly into any of the existing 
categories, yet there may well be substantial creativity and investment in creating a 
new perfume.  And of course other fun examples have been offered,14 some of 
which will be discussed today:  type fonts, yoga poses, recipes,15 the design of a 
roller coaster, fireworks displays, invented languages like Klingon, and my 
personal favorite—a breeder breeding a new species of parakeet.16  These examples 
raise potentially tricky questions about how willing courts should be to recognize 
new categories of works if they can’t be fit into an existing category.  Are courts 
the proper venues for recognizing new categories, or should they leave this 
properly to Congress?  If the courts are the proper venue, how should they decide 
whether a category should be included?  This may well be an area for fertile future 
development. 
The last potential doctrine defining copyrightable subject matter that I want to 
talk briefly about is authorship.  Now of course authorship is a tremendously 
complex issue.  The term “author” is not defined anywhere in the Copyright Act.  
There is a tremendous amount of literature talking about copyright law’s definition 
of the author and the assumptions underlying it, and Jane Ginsburg, of course, has 
done more than anyone to advance our understanding of the central role of 
authorship in the copyright system.17 
Here today, I’m not so much interested in authorship as determining who among 
a list of different potential claimants gets the copyright.  Instead, I’m more 
interested in authorship as a doctrine that potentially defines whether a copyright 
exists in first place.  To have a copyrighted work, must there be an author?  The 
text of the Constitution certainly suggests so.  What about works for which 
authorship is ambiguous?  Can these be the subject of copyright?  This is where we 
get into questions about computer-generated works,18 works involving audience 
participation, works incorporating randomness (e.g. John Cage, Jean Arp),19 and of 
course animal-created works like the monkey selfie.  Do we need an author for 
copyright to exist?  How does copyright think about authorship and define this, not 
so much in terms of who gets the copyright, but whether a copyright exists in the 
first place? 
 
 13. HR, June 16, 2006, LJN AU8940, Kecofa/Lancôme (EC). 
 14. For many of these examples, see Reese, supra note 11. 
 15. Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s 
Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007). 
 16. Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 569 (2002). 
 17. See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, Legal Protection of Technological Measures Protecting Works of 
Authorship: International Obligations and the US Experience, 29 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 11 (2005); Jane 
Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in US Trademarks and Copyright Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263 
(2004); Jane Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL  L. REV. 
1063 (2003). 
 18. Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5. 
 19. Durham, supra note 16. 
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Thus in the end, I suggest that in addition to the traditional two doctrines of 
originality and fixation, we also have works of authorship, and also even the 
definition of author itself, all serving to define copyrightable subject matter and to 
police the proper scope of copyright. 
To see how these how these doctrines all work together in practice, consider the 
recent case, Kelley v. Chicago Park District.20  The artist, Chapman Kelley, in 1984 
installed an ambitious wildflower display in a park owned by the City of Chicago, 
in downtown Chicago.  The display consisted of two enormous flower beds planted 
with local wild flowers, bordered by gravel and steel, considered a form of living 
art, and tended by Kelley and others for many years.  By 2004, however, the beds 
had deteriorated, and the city’s goals for the property had changed, and so the city 
modified the work, dramatically reducing its size.  Kelley brought suit under the 
Visual Artists Rights Act21 arguing that these changes violated his right in 
integrity.22 
The case is a really nice illustration of how all four of these doctrines operate to 
police subject matter.  The district court found no violation.  It held that the work 
was a “painting or sculpture” within the meaning of VARA, but held that it was 
insufficiently original.23  The district court thus used the traditional originality 
doctrine to exclude the work from copyright.  The Seventh Circuit on appeal also 
agreed that there was no violation of VARA, but on different grounds.24  The court 
first raised doubts about the trial court’s conclusion that the work was a “painting 
or sculpture,” thus invoking “work of authorship” (or, more accurately, a VARA 
analog to the work of authorship) as a potential limit on subject matter.25  The court 
also disagreed with the lower court’s conclusion that the work was insufficiently 
original, instead finding that it satisfied the low originality threshold.  However, the 
court held that the work was nevertheless not protected because it was 
insufficiently fixed, because of the constantly changing nature of the flowers.26  
Indeed, the court went on to conclude that Kelley was not ultimately the author of 
the work, because the final display depended on other elements outside of his 
control, such as nature, the winds, weather, and all the rest.  Kelley thus provides a 
nice example of all four of these doctrines being used in one case to police the 
scope of copyrightable subject matter. 
Now of course, all of these doctrines are put under pressure by the boundary 
cases that are the subject of today’s conference.  Because these are boundary cases, 
there will be little doctrinal guidance, either in case law or legislative history.  In 
the Kelley case, for example, one could easily imagine the courts having gone the 
other way on every one of the doctrinal issues raised in that case. So this raises the 
next question that I want to spend a little time considering:  given the substantial 
 
 20. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 21. 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
 22. Kelley,  635 F.3d at 291. 
 23. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 04 Civ. 07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 29, 2008). 
 24. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 25. Id. at 302. 
 26. Id. at 303. 
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uncertainty at the boundary, what set of theories or policies can we look to, to help 
decide these tricky cases? 
One approach that I think would be extremely unhelpful would be to engage in 
formalistic reasoning, by which I mean trying to figure out what is inherent in the 
definition of “originality” or “work of authorship” or “authorship” or “creativity.”  
Of course, since we are all legal realists now, we should be immune from this kind 
of reasoning.  But in practice, it is all too easy to slip into these kinds of essentialist 
arguments, so this is mostly just a cautionary point, that we need to be particularly 
careful to resist arguing over “what is creativity” except to the extent that it helps 
inform some underlying theory or policy. 
Another approach would be to look at this question purely instrumentally and 
ask whether we need incentives for the creation of these kinds of works.  To the 
extent that copyright is about solving the problem of underproduction of certain 
kinds of works, do these boundary cases indicate a need for copyright to provide 
incentives?  Will we not have enough of these works absent copyright protection?  
In the monkey selfie case, for example, with respect to questions of authorship, do 
we need to provide incentives for the creation of these kinds of works?27  
Presumably the monkey doesn’t respond to copyright incentives. But will the 
photographer respond to incentives?  If we don’t protect the work, will this lead to 
underproduction or under-dissemination of these kinds of works, not just animal 
selfies but other photos and movies that result from setting up a camera and waiting 
for things to happen?  Similarly, with respect to computer-generated works, do we 
need to create incentives for the creation of such works, and if so, how should we 
structure these incentives?  This is one set of familiar questions that we might ask, 
under the instrumental view. 
Another approach would be to look at this question from a non-instrumental 
perspective and ask whether the kind of creative labor at issue should be or 
deserves to be rewarded.  Whether we ground this in Lockean labor theories or 
Hegelian theories of property as personality, the idea is to ask whether this is the 
type of creative labor that copyright should reward.  So, again, going back to the 
monkey selfie case:  who deserves a reward for the creative labor?  Whether the 
monkey is engaging in creative labor is a tricky question—probably not, at least by 
our standards.  Does the photographer deserve reward for his labor?  How much 
labor was there?  How creative was he?  Was this purely accidental, as some of the 
initial reports suggest?  What if he had set out the camera on purpose hoping that a 
monkey would pick it up?  Similarly, with respect to computer-generated works, 
how do we think about creative labor in that context?  Is the program laboring in 
any sense?  What about the author of the program?  Clearly he or she is engaged in 
labor, but is it the kind of creative labor we want to reward, or is it more technical 
in nature?  These are the kinds of questions that this perspective would raise. 
Now both of these are pretty standard theoretical approaches we might apply to 
any question of copyright scope, and one could imagine still other theories 
grounded in the public domain, democratic participation, and all the rest. But what 
 
 27. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 28, 2016). 
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I do want to suggest here at the very end, in the final part of my remarks, is that 
underlying both of these frameworks, and many others, is a question that does not 
get as much attention as it should, namely, from an aesthetic perspective—whether 
the kinds of works at issue are worth rewarding or incentivizing. 
Under an instrumental view, we ask whether incentives are necessary to lead to 
the production of these kinds of works, but that of course presupposes that we want 
these kinds of works to be created.  And so the fundamental question is:  do we?  
What kinds of works do we want our system of copyright to create?  Assuming that 
incentives would help, which is a non-trivial question, do we want more monkey 
selfies, computer-generated works, recipes, et cetera.  And this is fundamentally a 
question of value.  Looking purely at incentives does not give us a clear answer.  
After all, one could argue that incentives are necessary to create new and better 
databases.  Yet even if this were true, the Supreme Court in Feist has said that this 
is simply not the realm of copyright.28  And so we need to decide upon the kind of 
works we want to incentivize. 
Similarly, under the moral rights view, we ask whether there is a moral claim to 
this kind of creative labor, but again this requires a judgment about the kinds of 
creative labor that are worth rewarding.  What kinds of creative labor?  What 
counts as creativity?  We don’t reward all kinds of labor, like sweat of the brow or 
unoriginal labor.  Does creating a software program that writes music count?  Does 
leaving a camera unattended in the rainforest count?  And this is fundamentally, 
again, a question of value. 
These kinds of questions of course are uncomfortable because the copyright 
system tries to be as value neutral as possible.  Going back to Justice Holmes and 
Bleistein,29 the courts have insisted that they are not in the position to make these 
kinds of aesthetic judgments.  And for good reason, because such judgments are 
often extremely subjective.  But as others have pointed out, particularly my 
colleagues Fred Yen, Zahr Said, and others, such judgments are inevitable in many 
areas of copyright, and certainly the issue of subject matter raises these issues very 
directly.30 
Going back to the Kelley case, the two courts in this case spent most of their 
time analyzing all of the various scope-defining doctrines.  The doctrinal materials 
are sufficiently open textured that a court could have come out either way on any of 
them.  What prompted the courts to decide the way they did?  Certainly they were 
informed by the doctrinal categories they were operating under, but I would argue 
that underlying the court’s decision-making is also an unstated but powerful 
intuition that copyright is just not about this kind of work, that this is just not the 
kind of creative activity that copyright is meant to protect. 
So in deciding these boundary cases we really cannot, I would argue, avoid 
making the substantive value judgment about what is important.  We are going to 
 
 28. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 341 (1991). 
 29. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1902). 
 30. Zahr Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 (2015); Alfred C. 
Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998). 
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be forced to make the decision about what kinds of creativity we want to reward or 
incentivize, and ultimately we cannot avoid the substantive question:  what is 
copyright ultimately about? 
So if we have to make these judgments, how might we decide? What could we 
look to beyond our own subjective viewpoints?  One can imagine many different 
potential sources.  We could look to history and custom, but this has obvious 
downsides since times change.  After all, the original Copyright Act only protected 
books, maps, and charts, and our understanding of copyrightable subject matter has 
expanded drastically over the years.  Relatedly, we could look to the constitutional 
authorization31 and ask what kinds of works promote the “progress of science” as 
originally understood by the framers.  We could look to the structure of copyright 
law for guidance—for example, the list of works in section 102(a)—to help 
analogize or implicitly define a field of copyrightable subject matter.32  Thus, for 
example, we might include fireworks displays as analogous to audio visual works, 
but exclude new breeds of parakeets as being too far outside the list of works in 
section 102(a).  We could also look outside the legal materials, to opinions of 
people in the field or to aesthetic or literary theories of merit.33  For example, in 
Kelley, the court acknowledged that some might consider the flower beds a form of 
postmodern art, but ultimately rejected the implications of this.  These are all 
different sources for engaging in a more robust discussion about what we in the end 
value. 
Now I do not pretend to have the answer to precisely how courts should engage 
in this kind of discussion in these close boundary cases.  However, I do have two 
suggestions about how courts might approach this.  First, in making these close 
decisions, I think courts should adopt a perspective not of aesthetic neutrality, 
which I think is impossible, but aesthetic humility.  This would recognize that these 
kinds of judgments are highly contingent, often influenced by the judge’s own prior 
experiences or perspective.  And in this light, I think judges should be willing to 
give deference to claims of artistic or other value before dismissing them too 
quickly. 
Second, and relatedly, the courts should also adopt a perspective of empirical 
humility.  Empirically, will expanding protection lead to more creativity?  This is 
often a trickier question than we assume.  Also, what will the likely impact be on 
others in this same community of creativity?  Creating new forms of protection 
potentially changes the status quo, so we need to be very careful about imposing 
new protection in areas that did not have them before, recognizing that this might 
disrupt settled expectations and in the end do more harm than good.  (The 
experience in patent law, with its recognition of new subject matters, is in some 
ways a cautionary tale.)  Note that there is also an institutional component to this 
humility, recognizing the limitations that judges operate under in making these 
 
 31. Christopher J. Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016). 
 32. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 33. See supra note 30. 
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difficult assessments, and recognizing also that judges may be less able to cabin the 
scope of these new rights through statutory or specific exceptions, as Congress did 
when it expanded subject matter to include architectural works, software, and 
sound recordings.   
These are two modest suggestions for how courts might respond to the daunting 
task of deciding these cases at the outer boundaries of copyright.  One expands the 
subject matter scope by encouraging a broader understanding of creativity.  The 
other limits subject matter by requiring some assurance that, even if we think the 
work is a type that deserves protection, we are relatively certain that extending 
copyright will do more good than harm.  In the end, both of these are suggestions 
that attempt to cabin the inherent subjectivity that exists in deciding what I think is 
ultimately the question presented by this conference:  what exactly is in that box?  
Other than the monkey of course.  Thank you very much. 
 
